University of Vermont

UVM ScholarWorks
College of Agriculture and Life Sciences Faculty
Publications

College of Agriculture and Life Sciences

1-1-2020

Open knowledge commons versus privatized gain in a fractured
information ecology: Lessons from COVID-19 for the future of
sustainability
Martin Hensher
Deakin University

Katie Kish
Université McGill

Joshua Farley
University of Vermont

Stephen Quilley
University of Waterloo

Katharine Zywert
University of Waterloo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/calsfac
Part of the Human Ecology Commons, and the Medicine and Health Commons

Recommended Citation
Hensher M, Kish K, Farley J, Quilley S, Zywert K. Open knowledge commons versus privatized gain in a
fractured information ecology: lessons from COVID-19 for the future of sustainability. Global
Sustainability. 2020;3.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at UVM
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Agriculture and Life Sciences Faculty Publications
by an authorized administrator of UVM ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@uvm.edu.

Global Sustainability
cambridge.org/sus

Intelligence Briefing
Cite this article: Hensher M, Kish K, Farley J,
Quilley S, Zywert K (2020). Open knowledge
commons versus privatized gain in a fractured
information ecology: lessons from COVID-19
for the future of sustainability. Global
Sustainability 3, e26, 1–5. https://doi.org/
10.1017/sus.2020.21
Received: 19 July 2020
Accepted: 27 July 2020
Keywords:
COVID-19; information ecology; innovation;
intellectual property; knowledge commons;
patents
Author for correspondence:
Associate Professor Martin Hensher,
E-mail: martin.hensher@deakin.edu.au

Open knowledge commons versus privatized
gain in a fractured information ecology: lessons
from COVID-19 for the future of sustainability
Martin Hensher1

, Katie Kish2, Joshua Farley3, Stephen Quilley4

and Katharine Zywert4
1

Institute for Health Transformation, Deakin University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia; 2Leadership for the
Ecozooic/Economics for the Anthropocene Projects, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; 3Community
Development and Applied Economics Department, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA and 4School of
Environment, Resources and Sustainability, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Abstract
COVID-19 has shone a bright light on a number of failings and weaknesses in how current
economic models handle information and knowledge. Some of these are familiar issues that
have long been understood but not acted upon effectively – for example, the danger that current systems of intellectual property and patent protection are actually inimical to delivering a
cost-effective vaccine available to all, whereas treating knowledge as a commons and a public
good is much more likely to deliver efficient outcomes for the entire global population. But
COVID-19 has also demonstrated that traditional models of knowledge production and dissemination are failing us; scientific knowledge is becoming weaponized and hyper-partisan,
and confidence in this knowledge is falling. We believe that the challenges that COVID-19
has exposed in the information economy and ecology will be of increasing applicability across
the whole spectrum of sustainability; sustainability scholars and policymakers need to understand and grasp them now if we are to avoid contagion into other sectors due to the preventable errors that have marred the global response to COVID-19.
Social media summary
COVID-19 highlights both the failures of privatized knowledge and worrying fractures in the
wider information ecology.

1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a bright light upon the decisions and actions of governments, corporations, health systems and populations. Millions have been infected and hundreds of thousands have died in the months since knowledge of the SARS-CoV-2
coronavirus became widespread. Information and knowledge – good or bad, shared or withheld – have been central to the evolution of the pandemic and our responses to it. These challenges are not new; their persistence and rapid re-emergence in this global crisis suggest
strongly that current policy and economic models have failed to address their root causes.
In this Intelligence Briefing, we argue that expanding existing models of open-source and commons knowledge will be critical not only to combat present and future pandemics, but also to
support the actions and collective investments required to safeguard human and planetary
health and sustainability. Not surprisingly, these models will have far-reaching consequences
for established economic and business models. However, COVID-19 has also revealed concerning fractures in the broader scientific and information ecologies, which have not only
impeded the response to the pandemic, but may bode ill for science-based policy and decisionmaking in all fields of sustainability.
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by
Cambridge University Press. This is an Open
Access article, distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.

2. The economics of proprietary versus open knowledge in the pandemic
Knowledge, information and uncertainty have been central to the story of COVID-19 so far, as
have long-standing tensions between collaboration and competition. Heroic efforts have been
made to share the results of initial research widely and freely, including the genomic sequence
of the virus itself, clinical and epidemiological data, patterns and designs to allow local 3D
printing of personal protective equipment (PPE) items and ventilator components and international efforts to develop vaccines. And, of course, much still simply remains unknown about
COVID-19. Yet accusations and counteraccusations fly as to whether China was transparent
enough in its release of data early in the pandemic, while the USA’s actions undermine the
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ability of the World Health Organization (WHO) to share reliable
information; the limitations of peer-reviewed and open-access
journal publishing as a vehicle for rapid dissemination of validated and reliable scientific results are yet again on display;
while disinformation and conspiracy theories have run riot worldwide. This is to say nothing of the unseemly scramble between
nations to source key physical supplies such as PPE and ventilators, ranging from bidding wars to the use of intelligence agencies
to secure supplies ahead of other nations, as well as allegations of
cyberespionage to steal information on promising candidate
vaccines.
Indeed, COVID-19 provides a useful lens on questions of scarcity
that are likely to recur across the terrain of planetary health in
the years to come. From the perspective of economics, a resource
is scarce if the quantity available is insufficient to satisfy all
demands, which must then compete for access. Only scarce
resources have market value, and markets allocate them to the
highest bidder. Growing demand for many essential physical products – some as simple as facemasks and hand sanitizer – called
attention to their scarcity even in wealthy nations. The revelation
of the limitations of physical supply chains has been an unwelcome and unsettling intrusion into the worldviews of both industry and consumers. Meanwhile, this crisis has only worsened the
ever-present problem of real resource scarcity in the world’s
poorer societies. We would do well to take note of these lessons.
Global supply chains are increasingly likely to be vulnerable to
disruption from intersecting environmental, social and economic
crises. More immediately, fears are growing over near-term risks
of extreme food shortages and famine in several regions, as
COVID-19, conflict, extreme weather and crop pests interact
(FSIN, 2020).
Even while the recent re-emergence of physical scarcity under
COVID-19 has come as a shock to the rich world, for many decades conditions of artificial scarcity have been induced as a deliberate aim of economic policy. Existing knowledge is not scarce,
since use by one person does not leave any less available to others;
knowledge, in fact, improves with use. One reason that masks are
scarce, as Stiglitz et al. (2020) have pointed out, is the 441 patents
owned by 3M that mention ‘respirator’ or ‘N95’. Patent and intellectual property protections – the granting of monopoly rights,
the antithesis of market competition – have, under conventional
economic wisdom, been viewed as necessary to incentivize innovation. Innovations – whether new drugs and vaccines, robots or
software – incur high upfront fixed costs, but then have a low
(or, in the case of information, zero) marginal cost of production.
It costs an estimated average of US$2.6 billion to bring a new drug
to market (DiMasi et al., 2016) and an estimated US$319–469
million to take a vaccine from preclinical trial to Phase 2a of clinical trials (Gouglas et al., 2018), which are now underway for the
most advanced potential COVID-19 vaccines, but with no guarantee of success. Yet it may cost only pennies to manufacture
the resulting vaccine. The more units produced, the lower the
average total cost of production. Firms competing to develop
COVID-19 vaccines inefficiently replicate fixed costs, and if several are successful, each firm will have to charge more to earn a
profit. High fixed costs and low marginal costs are characteristic
of natural monopolies, including most public utilities (water, electric or sewage), which are tightly regulated in order to prevent
price gouging. Price gouging is particularly problematic for commodities with inelastic demand, such as vaccines and life-saving
drugs, for which revenue declines as output increases and profits
are maximized by restricting production.
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Conventional theory claims that only guaranteed monopoly
profits can incentivize entrepreneurial firms to make the investments required to develop new technologies and products
(DeLong & Summers, 2001). Yet concerns have been growing
for years that traditional patent protections actually slow innovation and increase research costs by forcing researchers to negotiate licensing fees with holders of related patents (including many
held by patent trolls), and that these protections reduce social welfare through monopoly pricing (Benkler, 2004; Heller, 1998;
Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Monopoly rents from patents make
the pharmaceutical industry one of the most profitable industries
globally (Prasad & Mailankody, 2017; Spitz & Wickham, 2012).
The profound problems that this model poses to ensuring affordable access to medicine in lower-income countries, for neglected
diseases and for vaccines of greatest value to the poor have
been well documented over many years (Baker et al., 2017).
The higher the price charged for a coronavirus vaccine, the
lower the demand, the lower the likelihood of achieving herd
immunity and the greater the likelihood that the virus will evolve
new vaccine-resistant strains. The public good nature of vaccines
– one person’s use confers benefits on others – even justifies negative prices. Relying on market allocation systems for a critical vaccine therefore risks failing to generate the information most
needed by society to produce it at least cost and will likely keep
it artificially scarce even once it is available (Farley &
Kubiszewski, 2015),
3. Distortion and rent-seeking in COVID-19 intervention
research
In the case of COVID-19, treatments and vaccines are being pursued by a mix of for-profit, often publicly funded firms explicitly
seeking patent rights and public or not-for-profit initiatives and
collaboratives that may open up successful innovations for opensource manufacture. While genomic information on SARS-CoV-2
has been extensively shared amongst a worldwide network of
researchers (Nature, 2020), current efforts to develop more than
150 candidate vaccines for COVID-19 are highly fragmented
(Lancet, 2020). Alongside traditional private-sector efforts, some
international collaboratives do exist, yet it is not clear that these
will provide open access to either products or intellectual property
(Lancet, 2020). The availability and affordability of effective
COVID-19 interventions may therefore hinge simply on who
arrives first – a rather capricious outcome for many. In the USA,
Big Pharma has not only successfully lobbied for US$3 billion in
government funding to develop treatments for COVID-19, but
also for the right to patent the vaccine with no restrictions on
the prices they charge (Karlin-Smith, 2020). Oxford University’s
Jenner Institute provided exclusive licensing for its publicly funded
vaccine, currently in clinical trials, to UK-based AstraZeneca, with
no commitment to public access (AstraZeneca, 2020).
The governments of several high-income countries have ‘preordered’ large volumes of vaccine from several of these initiatives,
raising questions about whether and when other nations might
receive access. For example, the GAVI Alliance has used its
COVAX Advance Market Commitment to pre-order 300 million
doses of the putative Oxford University–AstraZeneca vaccine for
US$750 million on behalf of the world’s poorest countries.
COVAX is a facility that is open for any country to pool funds
for the purchase of vaccines and for donors to direct overseas
development assistance towards vaccine purchase for low- and
lower middle-income nations (GAVI, 2020). However, the US
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government has also pre-ordered the same quantity from
AstraZeneca, albeit for a total cost of US$1.2 billion (Prabhala
& Elder, 2020). WHO and others are exhorting vaccine and
other manufacturers to share knowledge, intellectual property
and data through initiatives such as the COVID-19 Technology
Access Pool (WHO, 2020b) and the Open COVID Pledge (opencovidpledge, 2020). Yet COVAX and the WHO’s Global
Allocation Framework (WHO, 2020a) are silent on intellectual
property and implicitly assume market purchasing from existing
suppliers. It is notable that the pledgers listed on the Open
COVID Pledge website did not, at the time of writing, include
any vaccine or pharmaceutical firms.
COVID-19 has already provided significant opportunities for
the realization of large economic rents in the vaccines and pharmaceuticals sector. The non-governmental Coalition for Epidemic
Preparedness (CEPI), which works alongside GAVI and WHO,
granted US$388 million to Novavax, driving a massive jump in
its stock price (Nathan-Kazis, 2020) in anticipation of monopoly
profits. Executives at Moderna raised eyebrows by arranging for
legal sales of stock, timed to take place immediately after encouraging announcements on its candidate COVID-19 vaccine (Egan
& Isidore, 2020). Large sums of public funding are also available
for candidate treatments for COVID-19, spurring feverish activity
by large and small pharmaceutical firms alike, often backed by
hedge funds and using technologies licensed from universitybased, publicly funded research (Rowland, 2020). One important
strand of the surprising controversy over the use of the antimalarial agent hydroxychloroquine in COVID-19 (see Box 1) has
been the tension between repurposing old and off-patent drugs
(like hydroxychloroquine and the steroid dexamethasone),
which offer only limited profit opportunities, and novel agents
(such as remdesivir), which offer the prospect of patents and
monopoly rents. The willingness of the US government to
advance purchase almost all of the manufacturing pipeline of
remdesivir for July, August and September will certainly cement
these profits for the drug’s makers. It is perhaps unsurprising
that there has been even less enthusiasm for conducting badly
needed research into key social interventions (such as the use of
facemasks by the general public or specific aspects of social distancing), which offer even less prospect of future profitability.
4. The COVID-19 pandemic in a damaged information
ecology
Health and medical research have long relied on the publication
of results in peer-reviewed scientific journals as the key mechanism for quality control and dissemination. The wisdom of this
reliance has been under question for several years in the light of
the emerging ‘crisis of reproducibility’ affecting medicine and
many other scientific disciplines (Ioannidis, 2005, 2016; Munafò
et al., 2017). Attempts to massively accelerate the generation
and publishing of COVID-19 research as an urgent response to
the voracious hunger for information on the pandemic were
therefore always going to contain some inherent risks to quality
and reliability, even though emerging alternatives (such as the
increasingly popular use of online preprints) still offer no real
substitute for the peer-review process. Journals across healthcare
and beyond issued special calls for papers and instigated accelerated review processes for COVID-19 submissions. By early July,
more than 30,000 articles on COVID-19 were listed on the health
bibliographic database PubMed (Saitz & Schwitzer, 2020). From a
first submission on COVID-19 on 15 January, the journal Lancet
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Box 1. The hydroxychloroquine roller coaster.
Hydroxychloroquine (HCQ), an antimalarial medication approved for use in
1955, came to prominence after a small French study, published on 20
March 2020, suggested that it had been effective in treating COVID-19
patients. Trials of HCQ proliferated around the world, while US President
Donald Trump vigorously endorsed the use of the drug (Saitz &
Schwitzer, 2020). Yet a string of contradictory results followed rapidly,
some reporting no benefit or even risks of harm from the drug, while others
supported its use. Interpretation was complex, as trials investigated many
different applications of HCQ in newly diagnosed, mildly ill or severely ill
patients, using quite different treatment regimes. In a politicization of
pharmaceutical science not seen since the peak of South African AIDS denialism in the early 2000s (Simelela et al., 2015), acceptance of evidence for or
against HCQ split down partisan lines in the USA. A major global study in
the prestigious medical journal The Lancet reported that HCQ showed no
benefits in COVID-19 and provided evidence of elevated cardiovascular
adverse events and decreased survival in patients receiving the drug
(Mehra et al., 2020b). The HCQ arms of several major international trials
were immediately suspended, and several nations advised against using
the drug for COVID-19. Yet little more than week later, the study’s authors
retracted it in full (Mehra et al., 2020c) – along with a parallel study on cardiovascular risk in COVID-19 patients, published in the New England Journal
of Medicine (Mehra et al., 2020a) – after it emerged that the commercial
dataset that they had used was at best unvalidated, if not actually fraudulent. Their papers had been accepted for publication after peer review in
two of the world’s most prestigious medical journals. Studies including
HCQ restarted, then closed down again (WHO, 2020c). At the time of writing,
most jurisdictions now advise against the drug’s use in COVID-19 patients.
This is not the place to second-guess what the eventual verdict of
large-scale trials will ultimately be on HCQ’s true efficacy in different patient
cohorts. However, its story so far is a cautionary tale on the perils of
attempting to base agile policy and clinical decisions on fast-moving and
contradictory, partial evidence – especially once denialist claims take a
hold in political networks; and it provides an extraordinary illustration
that scientific error and misconduct can occur even in the midst of the
response to a global public health emergency.

Global Health saw its total submissions increase by 185% by June
2020 relative to the previous year (Lancet Global Health, 2020).
Unsurprisingly, many journals have experienced a degree of overwhelm in this period, amongst editors, reviewers and, indeed,
readers. Yet pharmaceutical and vaccine companies have drawn
criticism for a tendency to release favourable results by press
release, rather than via scientific publishing routes – a critique
that has also been levelled at the UK’s nationwide, publicly funded
RECOVERY trial, which has thus far led the way in delivering
large-scale drug trial results on COVID-19 therapies (Wise &
Coombes, 2020). Box 1 describes how some of the limitations
of the current peer-reviewed publication model for dissemination
have manifested themselves in the particularly controversial case
of the drug hydroxychloroquine.
However, there have been even more worrying signs of a fracturing information ecology at the interface of science, policy and
public discourse. Contested scientific evidence around interventions such as hydroxychloroquine and the use of facemasks by
the public has somehow mutated into their becoming political
totems in a number of countries. The undermining of WHO by
the US government’s decision to withdraw from membership,
after months of criticism, has interacted with the perceived failure
of many national institutions, most notably the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, leaving a void in authoritative
guidance that has allowed vested interests and conspiracy theories
to gain a foothold. Growing ‘vaccine hesitancy’ and the rise of the
‘antivaxxer’ movement have been evident for several years (Dubé
et al., 2015), with WHO listing this phenomenon only last year
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(along with a global pandemic and the emergence of high-threat
pathogens) as one of its top ten threats to global health (WHO,
2019b). COVID-19 has given further life to antivaxxer narratives
and conspiracy theories, with recent polls indicating that 30–35%
of young American adults probably or definitely would not accept
a COVID-19 vaccine (AP-NORC, 2020). More broadly, the emergence of COVID-19 in the hyper-connected social media world of
2020 has given rise to grave problems of misinformation on many
aspects of the pandemic (Santos-Rutschman, 2020) and concerns
that some of these trends may in fact reflect deliberate disinformation strategies by state and non-state actors in the new era of
‘information warfare’ (Prier, 2017).
5. Lessons for global sustainability
The damaged information ecology in which global and national
responses to COVID-19 are currently playing out should be of
deep concern to all those working towards the adoption of
more sustainable policies, economics and ways of life. There
have been significant failures of global information coordination
and cooperation just when the stakes were highest; international
and national institutions have struggled to retain authority and
confidence in the face of a flood of misinformation and the appropriation of the pandemic for political purposes in several nations.
The worst excesses of COVID-19 politicization and denial bear
many resemblances to battles that have played out over climate
change science and policy for decades. It is chastening to see similar forces also infect a global public health emergency. COVID-19
is not a dress rehearsal for dealing with climate change and
planetary boundaries. Yet it may be closer to a dress rehearsal
for dealing with the cascading crises that ecological tipping points
will bring with them; and if it is, the results do not look pretty so
far. We need to ensure urgently that the science–policy nexus is
stronger and more robust to uncertainty and disinformation at
national and international levels, not only to support long-term
policymaking, but also to avoid chaotic responses to more immediate crises.
More broadly, we need modes of knowledge generation and
innovation that prioritize human welfare over profits. Financial
prizes or governmental purchase of patents (Baker et al., 2017)
can make knowledge free, but fail to stimulate cooperation in
research and development (R&D). The peer-to-peer (P2P) and
commons knowledge economy prioritizes the sharing of information and knowledge. P2P and open hardware make designs and
knowledge freely available through open licenses, incentivizing
competitive firms to produce them at the lowest possible cost.
P2P builds on humanity’s altruistic and cooperative nature as a
mode of relationship that allows individuals to connect, collaborate, produce and share without barrier or gain beyond collective
pro-social evolution (Pazaitis et al., 2019), but it could be made
even more effective with public financing, especially for R&D
into urgently needed public goods. Land-grant universities in
the USA once took this approach, until the Bayh–Dole Act of
1980 allowed both industries and universities to exclusively patent
publicly funded innovations (Sampat, 2006). Salaried scientists are
unlikely to work harder for corporate profits than for the public
good, and free knowledge still exploits the ability of competitive
markets to minimize production costs. There is increasing acceptance among economists that the state must do much more than
simply attempting to fix market failures and that transitioning
to a sustainable economic model requires active steering by the
state to create a technological revolution for the benefit of all
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(Mazzucato, 2016; Perez, 2017). Our response to global pandemics and other contagious diseases requires a commons knowledge economy, in which P2P-generated and publicly funded R&D
into treatments and cures is freely available to all. Even before
COVID-19, the effective abandonment of new antibiotic development by the for-profit pharmaceutical industry (WHO, 2019a) –
desperately needed in the face of the rising tide of antimicrobial
resistance – should be a warning signal that traditional models
of for-profit innovation may fail when faced with such complex
challenges.
While many people claim that the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the need for a more resilient economy, we may well have
passed so many ecological and economic thresholds that bouncing back is not only undesirable, but also impossible. The most
pressing challenges society currently faces, from climate change
to pandemics, are social dilemmas best solved through cooperation (Gintis, 2011). While competition for fossil fuels is unavoidable, there is no competition between geographical regions for the
solar energy that must replace it, and the knowledge for capturing
it improves through use. Patents on green technologies also create
artificial scarcity, hindering our fight against ecological calamity.
Cooperation is an anti-fragile strategy (Taleb, 2012) in which
each challenge we collectively confront stimulates the trust and
reciprocity required to address more difficult future challenges.
Cooperative generation and sharing of knowledge, stimulated by
playful curiosity, trust and reciprocity, will not only help us to
solve the COVID-19 crisis, but also enhance our ability to solve
the numerous other crises we currently face.
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